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Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*
Jennifer A. Blackburn"
and Courtney E. Ferrell**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013,1 in
which principles of administrative law were either illuminated or formed
an important piece of the decision making. The Article begins with a
discussion on the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement
and then covers a series of cases discussing statutory construction. The
next topic is the standard of review of an agency decision, which is
followed by a discussion on sovereign immunity. The Article concludes
with a brief review of enactments from the 2013 regular session of the
Georgia General Assembly.
II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
This year's Article begins with the court's reinforcement of the wellestablished rule that judicial review of a final agency decision is
available only when all administrative remedies have been exhausted.

* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1975); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1978).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.A., 2000); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2004).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia College
& State University (B.A., 2004); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
magna cum laude, 2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia administrative law during the prior survey period, see
Martin M. Wilson, Jennifer A. Blackburn & Courtney E. Ferrell, Administrative Law,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REv. 39 (2012).
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In Ass'n of Guineans in Atlanta, Inc. v. DeKalb County,2 the supreme
court affirmed the Superior Court of DeKalb County's dismissal of a
constitutional challenge to a local zoning ordinance based on religion by
the Association of Guineans in Atlanta (Association).? A landowner
must raise all constitutional challenges to a zoning ordinance before the
local governing body in order to afford the body the opportunity to
amend the ordinance to bring it within constitutional limits.' Such a
challenge cannot be made for the first time in superior court.' The
Association alleged that it raised the constitutional challenges by
verbally stating at the hearing before the DeKalb County Board of
Commissioners (BOC) that it intended to use the property as a place of
worship. However, the Association never used the words "constitutional"
or "unconstitutional"-either verbally or in writing-at any time during
the BOC hearing. The mere assertion that the Association intended to
use the property as a place of worship was insufficient to give the BOC
proper notice of a challenge to the constitutionality of the zoning
ordinance.6 Accordingly, the Association failed to exhaust all the
available administrative remedies, and the supreme court affirmed the
superior court's dismissal of the constitutional challenge to the zoning
ordinance.'
Similarly, in another case, the court of appeals held that the appellant,
Excelsior Electrical Membership Corporation (Excelsior), also failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies by not properly raising an issue in
writing during administrative proceedings before the Georgia Public
Service Commission (PSC).' Section 50-13-19(b) of the Official Code of
Georgia (O.C.G.A.)? provides that appeals of an agency decision should
be made by written petition to be filed and served on all parties.o The
petition should define the dispute, contain facts showing the petitioner
is aggrieved, and include the ground on which the decision should be
reversed or modified." Because Excelsior only raised the issue verbally

2. 292 Ga. 362, 738 S.E.2d 40 (2013).
3. Id. at 362-63, 738 S.E.2d at 41.
4. Id. (citing Shockley v. Fayette Cnty., 260 Ga. 489,490,396 S.E.2d 883,884 (1990)).
5. Id. at 363, 738 S.E.2d at 41 (citing Cooper v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke Cnty.,
277 Ga. 360, 361, 589 S.E.2d 105, 107 (2003)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Excelsior Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 322 Ga. App. 687, 745
S.E.2d 870, 875 (2013).
9. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(b) (2013).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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before the PSC and not in writing, the issue was not properly raised, and
the superior court correctly determined the issue was waived."
While the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is wellsettled law, there are limited exceptions where the courts will find it
futile, and therefore unnecessary, for petitioners to exhaust their
administrative remedies.' 3 The court of appeals considered whether
the administrative remedies available to the Georgia Society of
Ambulatory Surgery Centers (GSASC) were inadequate.'4 Where the
administrative remedy available would result in loss of livelihood, the
remedy is deemed inadequate under the law." However, this is a very
limited exception and is to be strictly construed." GSASC's argument
that administrative remedies were inadequate because its members
could be criminally prosecuted for giving false information was not
persuasive." The Georgia Department of Community Health (DCH)
had procedures in place that were available to GSASC's members prior
to the agency taking any final adverse action. Therefore adequate
administrative remedies were available to aggrieved parties, and the
exception did not apply.'
The futility exception to the doctrine of administrative exhaustion was
considered in MariettaProperties,LLC v. City of Marietta," where the
court of appeals held the administrative remedy of applying to the
zoning board for a permit was not futile.20 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is futile only where additional administrative review would
result in the same body deciding the same issue that is being appealed.2 ' Because Marietta Properties, LLC had never applied for a
building permit, nor had the city denied such a permit, the court
determined it would be premature for a superior court to rule on vested
rights.22

12. Excelsior, 322 Ga. App. at 693, 745 S.E.2d at 875.
13. Ga. Soc'y of Ambulatory Surgery Ctrs. v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 316 Ga. App.
433, 434, 729 S.E.2d 565, 566 (2012).
14. Id. at 433-34, 729 S.E.2d at 565-66.
15. Id. (citing Moss v. Cent. State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 404, 339 S.E.2d 226,227 (1986)).
16. Moss, 255 Ga. at 404, 339 S.E.2d at 227.
17. Ga. Soc'y ofAmbulatory Surgery Ctrs., 316 Ga. App. at 434 n.1, 729 S.E.2d at 566
n. 1.
18. Id. at 434, 729 S.E.2d at 566.
19. 319 Ga. App. 184, 732 S.E.2d 102 (2012).
20. Id. at 188, 732 S.E.2d at 106.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The next series of cases explores the long-standing rules of statutory
construction. In Brantley Land & 7Tmber, LLC v. W & D Investments,
Inc.," the court of appeals looked to determine whether the Superior
Court of Brantley County properly interpreted the statute as it related
to the underlying case.'
The goal of statutory interpretation is to
determine the legislative purpose.25 When the text of the statute is
plain and has but one reasonable meaning, the court must follow the
meaning of those words; however, if the text is ambiguous, the court
must construe the statute based on its legislative purpose and intent.26
Because the text of the statute at issue was "perfectly plain, and its
meaning [was] neither absurd, impossible [to enforce], or unreasonable,"
the court determined there was no need to defer to the legislative history
of the statute.
The court of appeals got "down and dirty" with an in-depth look at
statutory interpretation in a case focusing on water-quality issues. In
Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Forsyth County," the court
reviewed the Superior Court of Forsyth County's interpretation of
Georgia's water-quality anti-degradation rule.29
On appeal, the
interpretation of a statute or regulation is a question of law and requires
a de novo review.o The basic rules of statutory construction require
the court to look at the plain language of the statute to determine the
meaning and to read the words in the context of the whole regulation
rather than in isolation." Furthermore, the court must defer to the
agency's interpretation and enforcement.32 Applying these rules, the
court held that the administrative law judge incorrectly interpreted the
statute at issue and affirmed the superior court's reversal of that
decision."
In the final case in this section, the court applied the rules of statutory
interpretation to the award of attorney fees. Lakeview Behavioral

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

316 Ga. App. 277, 729 S.E.2d 458 (2012).
Id. at 279, 729 S.E.2d at 460.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 280-81, 729 S.E.2d at 461 (quoting Kerese v. State, 10 Ga. 95, 97 (1851)).
318 Ga. App. 499, 734 S.E.2d 242 (2012).
Id. at 500, 734 S.E.2d at 244.
Id. at 502, 734 S.E.2d at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 504, 734 S.E.2d at 246-47.
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Health System, LLC v. UHS Peachford, LP' centers on the Superior
Court of Fulton County's interpretation of the jurisdictional exception to
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.1(cYs" mandatory award of attorney fees."
Applying the standard rules of statutory construction, the court of
appeals examined what the legislature intended by the term "jurisdiction" in reference to the DCH." In interpreting statutes, courts must
presume the legislature "meant what it said and said what it meant."
To do so, the court must try to discern the legislative intent from both
the plain terms of the language used as well as the legislative history
surrounding the statute, reviewing both in the context of the statutory
scheme as a whole." Construing the statutory provisions together, the
court determined the legislature intended that a jurisdictional challenge
to the DCH question whether the DCH has the power to act in a given
situation, rather than how it actually acted in that situation.'
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although Georgia courts have recognized the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in criminal as well as civil cases," it was unclear until this
year whether administrative proceedings in Georgia could have a
preclusive effect on subsequent criminal proceedings. In Malloy v.
State,4 2 the supreme court evaluated this issue and held that a
determination made in an administrative proceeding will not preclude
later criminal charges.43 The court noted that administrative decisions
are generally not granted the effect of collateral estoppel in later judicial
proceedings unless the following requirements are met:
(1) both proceedings involve the same parties ... ; (2) the issue was

actually litigated and determined in the first proceeding, (3) the
determination was essential to the judgment in the first proceeding;

34. 321 Ga. App. 820, 743 S.E.2d 492 (2013).
35. O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.1(c) (2012).
36. Lakeview Behavioral Health Sys., LLC, 321 Ga. App. at 822, 743 S.E.2d at 494.
37. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.1(c)).
38. Id. at 823, 743 S.E.2d at 495 (quoting Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Graham, 315 Ga.
App. 120, 122, 726 S.E.2d 617, 619 (2012)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 825, 743 S.E.2d at 496-97.
41. See, e.g., Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 265 Ga. 864, 866, 463 S.E.2d 5,
7 (1995) (civil case); Lindsey v. State, 227 Ga. 48, 52, 178 S.E.2d 848, 851 (1970) (criminal
case); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 119, 17 S.E.2d 573, 580 (1941) (criminal case).
42. 293 Ga. 350, 744 S.E.2d 778 (2013).
43. Id. at 353, 744 S.E.2d at 782.
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and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full
opportunity to litigate the issue in question."
Applying these prerequisites, Georgia courts have held that questions of
fact ruled upon by an administrative body are precluded from being
relitigated in later civil suits.' Malloy asserted that the requirements
for the application of collateral estoppel were met, mandating preclusion
of his criminal matter; however, the court disagreed, holding that the
fourth requirement was not met.46
Noting the differences in the nature and purpose of an administrative
and criminal proceeding, the court determined the State lacked a full
opportunity to litigate whether the appellant knowingly and willfully
committed fraud." Therefore, the court held that the determination
made in Malloy's favor in the administrative proceeding would not
preclude later criminal charges."
9
In Laskar v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia,"
the court of appeals evaluated the differences between quasi-judicial and
administrative functions in the context of a hearing committee's
recommendation for the termination of employment of Joy Laskar, a
university professor.o The court noted that "the first step in weighing
whether a trial court properly can hear a petition for certiorari is to
determine whether the petition is seeking review of a judicial or quasiGenerally, the
judicial action or merely an administrative one."
difference between an administrative action and a judicial or quasijudicial action turns on whether the parties were granted notice and the
opportunity to be heard."
During the employment review, Laskar was given notice of the
hearing, the right to counsel, and the right to present testimony and
evidence, after which the hearing committee made its findings and
However, the findings and recommendation were
recommendation.

44. Id. at 354, 744 S.E.2d at 783 (citing Swain v. State, 251 Ga. App. 110, 113, 552
S.E.2d 880, 882-83 (2001)).
45. Id. at 355, 744 S.E.2d at 783 (citing Jordan v. Bd. of Pub. Safety, 253 Ga. App. 339,
342, 559 S.E.2d 94,97 (2002); Blackwell v. Ga. Real Estate Comm'n, 205 Ga. App. 233,234,
421 S.E.2d 716, 717-18 (1992)).
46. Id. at 355, 358, 744 S.E.2d at 783, 785.
47. Id. at 357-58, 744 S.E.2d at 784-85.
48. Id. at 358, 744 S.E.2d at 785.
49. 320 Ga. App. 414, 740 S.E.2d 179 (2013).
50. Id. at 414-16, 740 S.E.2d at 180-81.
51. Id. at 416, 740 S.E.2d at 181.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 418, 740 S.E.2d at 182.
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not binding on the faculty member." Rather, the decision to terminate
employment was left to the university president, who was not required
to follow the hearing committee's recommendation." The court held
that "the final act resulting in Laskar's discharge was not the [hlearing
(c]ommittee's report, but rather the president's finding that good cause
existed to revoke Laskar's tenure and terminate his employment, and
that decision was an administrative one." Despite the procedures for
notice and hearing being present in Laskar's case, the court of appeals
held that the function of the hearing committee's findings and recommendation, the president's decision, and the Board of Regents' subsequent review of the president's decision was administrative in nature.
Therefore, the Superior Court of Fulton County properly dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
V.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

By overruling its previous holding in Keenan v. Plouffe," the
supreme court provided clarity surrounding official immunity as it
relates to physicians acting within the scope of their employment." In
Shekhawat v. Jones,61 the court granted certiorari to determine
whether physicians employed as faculty members at the Medical College
of Georgia were entitled to official immunity related to the treatment of
a newborn. 62 The court of appeals determined that a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding whether the physicians were acting
within the scope of their employment in treating the child."
The supreme court noted that Georgia's "appellate jurisprudence on
official immunity in the context of state-employed physicians has for the
past decade and a half strayed considerably from [a] straightforward
analysis," and that the "genesis of this misguided path was this [clourt's
opinion in Keenan v. Plouffe"' The court in Keenan held that a stateemployed physician did not enjoy official immunity because his conduct
in treating patients called for "'the exercise of his medical (as opposed
to governmental) discretion' and involved 'distinct obligations to [the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 420, 740 S.E.2d at 184.
Id. at 419-20, 740 S.E.2d at 183-84.
Id. at 421, 740 S.E.2d at 185.
267 Ga. 791, 482 S.E.2d 253 (1997).
Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 746 S.E.2d 89 (2013).
293 Ga. 468, 746 S.E.2d 89 (2013).
Id. at 468-69, 746 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 468, 746 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 471, 746 S.E.2d at 92.
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patient] that were independent of his official state duties."" This led
the court to determine that the physician was not acting within the
scope of his official state duties in treating the patient.66 However, in
Keenan, the court posed an important (but confusing) caveat, stating
that because the case involved the exercise of medical discretion
on a private-pay patient that was not controlled by the government
employer or by statute, [they did not need to] consider whether
immunity is appropriate for state-employed physicians who are
required to treat particular patients, or who are alleged to have
violated governmental, as opposed to medical, responsibilities, or whose
medical discretion is controlled or impacted by governmental standards

or constraints. 67

Since the Keenan decision, courts have struggled with the scope and
application of its holding. Shortly after Keenan, the court held that the
"key factor in Keenan [that] prevented reliance on official immunity was
that the patient was a private patient."68 More recently, the court of
appeals interpreted Keenan as holding that official immunity is
abrogated only where the state-employed physicians are treating privatepay patients and those patients have sought care from those particular
physicians, rather than simply from the state facilities at which they
worked."
The court in Shekhawat determined that post-Keenan cases have
shown that the straightforward official immunity analysis for stateemployed physicians had "devolved from the straightforward 'scope of
employment' test to a convoluted analysis examining the nature of the
discretion exercised, the identity of those to whom duties are owed, and
the payment sources and arrangements involved."O In Keenan, the
court had "conflated the test for official immunity with that for sovereign
immunity in distinguishing between medical and governmental
discretion and between the physician's duty to the patient and his duty
to the [s]tate."" With the rationale of Keenan effectively dismantled,
the court held that the analysis of a physician's official immunity under
the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA)" "shall proceed exclusively on the

65.
257).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. (alterations in orginal) (quoting Keenan, 267 Ga. at 793, 796,482 S.E.2d at 255,
Keenan, 267 Ga. at 795, 482 S.E.2d at 257.
Id. at 796 n.17, 482 S.E.2d at 257 n.17.
Harry v. Glynn Cnty., 269 Ga. 503, 505, 501 S.E.2d 196, 199 (1998).
Porter v. Guill, 298 Ga. App. 782, 786-87, 681 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (2009).
Shekhawal, 293 Ga. at 472-73, 746 S.E.2d at 92-93.
Id. at 473, 746 S.E.2d at 93.
O.C.G.A. ch. 50-21 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
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basis of whether the physician was acting within the scope of his state
employment in performing the treatment that is the subject of the
malpractice action."" Under that analysis, the court held that the
physicians were acting within the scope of their employment and were
entitled to official immunity.74
In DeKalb County School District v. Gold (Gold), the court of
appeals evaluated the claims of county teachers who brought suit after
the school district suspended its contributions to the employee annuity
plan.7 6 While there is no blanket waiver of sovereign immunity in
declaratory judgment actions, declaratory judgments against the state
have been recognized in certain contexts."
The teachers argued that the declaratory-judgment claim was
sustainable because it arose from the breach of a written contract.
The teachers pointed to the court's decision in Upper Oconee Basin Water
Authority v. Jackson County (Upper Oconee)" to support this argument." In that case, in evaluating whether the water authority had
breached an inter-governmental water-supply contract, the court noted
that the state constitution specifically waived immunity for "any action
ex contractu for the breach of any written contract."" In Upper Oconee,
the court, relying on the plaintiff's claim for breach of the agreement and
explaining that "the fact that [Jackson County] hald] expressly asked for
the [Upper Oconee Basin Water] Authority's obligations under the
[a] greement to be determined and enforced [did] not change the essential
nature of the claim," held that the Superior Court of Jackson County did
not err in refusing to dismiss the county's lawsuit on the basis of
sovereign immunity.8
However, the court noted that because the teachers in Gold, unlike the
parties in Upper Oconee, sought to recover damages for the breach of the
contract and desired a clarification about school system budgeting
"moving forward," the relief sought by the teachers went "far beyond an

73. Shekhawat, 293 Ga. at 474, 746 S.E.2d at 93.
74. Id.
75. 318 Ga. App. 633, 734 S.E.2d 466 (2012).
76. Id. at 633, 734 S.E.2d at 468.
77. Id. at 637, 734 S.E.2d at 471.
78. Id. at 637-38, 734 S.E.2d at 471.
79. 305 Ga. App. 409, 699 S.E.2d 605 (2010).
80. Gold, 318 Ga. App. at 637-38, 734 S.E.2d at 471.
81. Upper Oconee, 305 Ga. App. at 412-13, 699 S.E.2d at 608 (emphasis added for style)
(quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, 1 9(c)).
82. Id. at 413, 699 S.E.2d at 608.
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'action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract.'"" As such,
the teachers could not rely on Upper Oconee to show that the State had
waived its immunity to their declaratory judgment action.8 The court
held that because sovereign immunity barred the teachers' "claims for
declaratory judgment, money had and received, unjust enrichment,
promissory estoppel, and conversion," the Superior Court of DeKalb
County should have dismissed these claims."
As for the teachers' claims for breach of contract and the associated
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the trial court did not
err when it denied the school district's motion to dismiss those claims.8
This rested on the fact that "the legislative acts of the [school board in]
establishing a retirement plan for the [sichool [dlistrict employees may
become part of the employees' contract of employment."87 Because the
school board had resolved in 1979 to give its employees two years' notice
before terminating or reducing funding to the plan, the court held that
the teachers could possibly introduce evidence sufficient to warrant a
grant of relief for breach of a written contract.8 8
In Lockhart v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia,'
the court of appeals distinguished between a claim for assault and
battery, which is excepted from the GTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity, and a claim for negligence, which falls under the GTCA's
general waiver of immunity."o In that case, Lockhart sought dental
treatment from Dr. Nelson, a dentist at the Medical College of Georgia
School of Dentistry. Lockhart believed the dentist was going to place
implants in her upper left jaw, but the dentist also drilled down several
of her bottom teeth and installed temporary crowns. Dr. Nelson told the
patient that someone from his office would call Lockhart when she
needed to return to the office to have permanent crowns installed, but
no one followed up with the patient. After four months, Lockhart
contacted the dental clinic. However, by that time, her lower teeth had
turned to "bloody, stubby, soft-looking things."9 '
Prior to the decision in Lockhart, no Georgia appellate case had
examined the technical battery of unauthorized medical touching in the

83. Gold, 318 Ga. App. at 638-39,734 S.E.2d at 472 (emphasis added for style) (quoting
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, 1 9(c)).
84. Id. at 639, 734 S.E.2d at 472.
85. Id. at 633-34, 734 S.E.2d at 468-69.
86. Id. at 634, 734 S.E.2d at 469.
87. Id. at 644, 734 S.E.2d at 476.
88. Id. at 644-45, 734 S.E.2d at 476.
89. 316 Ga. App. 759, 730 S.E.2d 475 (2012).
90. Id. at 760, 730 S.E.2d at 477 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-23, -24(7) (2009)).
91. Id. at 759, 730 S.E.2d at 476.
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context of the GTCA's assault and battery exception." The court of
appeals recognized two distinct injuries to Lockhart: (1) the unauthorized grinding down of the patient's lower teeth and (2) the failure to
ensure removal of the temporary caps in time to prevent damage to the
teeth.9 3
The court then held that the Superior Court of Richmond County was
correct in dismissing Lockhart's claim of negligence regarding Dr.
Nelson's work on her lower teeth, as that action fell within the purview
of the assault and battery exception of the GTCA.94 Unconvinced by
the patient's argument that the battery exception applies only to
intentional batteries, the court noted that performing unauthorized
dental work is a battery sounding in tort.95
However, the plaintiff's claim that the defendant failed to follow up
and schedule an appointment to remove the temporary caps required a
separate analysis.' The court stated that "new acts of negligence may
occur" and that a complaint may allege "more than one act of professional negligence resulting in a new injury, where physicians failed timely
to warn a patient about preventative measures." The court held that
the doctor's failure to contact the patient for a new appointment and to
remove the temporary crowns was not battery; it was negligence, for
which the state had waived immunity.98 As such, the patient had met
her burden of establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity."
VI.

RECENT LEGISLATION

Although there were over twenty different enactments from the 2013
regular session of the Georgia General Assembly addressing the
composition and powers of agencies, the following legislation contains
the major highlights:
1. There has been established an Agricultural Commodity Commission for Beef'o

92. Id. at 760, 730 S.E.2d at 477.
93. Id. at 761, 730 S.E.2d at 478.
94. Id. at 761-62, 730 S.E.2d at 478.
95. Id. at 762, 730 S.E.2d at 478.
96. Id. at 763, 730 S.E.2d at 479.
97. Id. at 763-64, 730 S.E.2d at 479.
98. Id. at 764, 730 S.E.2d at 479-80.
99. Id. at 764-65, 730 S.E.2d at 480.
100. Ga. S. Bill 97 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 65 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 2-8-13
(2000 & Supp. 2013)).
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2. The Agricultural Commodity Commission for Georgia Grown
Products has also been formed."o'
3. A requirement has been imposed upon the Department of Natural
Resources that at least three members of the Board of Natural Resources
must be included on the board of directors of any nonprofit corporation
created by the department. 0 2
4. The membership of the Oconee River Greenway Authority has
been changed to let counties within the authority's boundaries appoint
no more than four residents.1 03
5. The Georgia Driver's Education Commission received an extension
of the time periods for the imposition of fines funding the commission
and for driver education.1os
6. The State Board of Education may now transfer properties held
in trust to the Georgia Foundation for Public Education, but only for
administrative purposes.'o
7. The Division of Archives and History has been transferred to the
University System of Georgia from its prior home at the Office of the
Secretary of State."
8. There is once again a Career and Technical Education Advisory
Commission.f'o
9. Public-officer filings and filings by candidates and elected officials
will now be handled by the Georgia Government Transparency and
Campaign Finance Commission instead of the Secretary of State.20s
10. The Georgia State Board of Pharmacy and the Georgia Board of
Dentistry have been transferred for administrative purposes from the

101. Ga. H.R. Bill 298 § 1,Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 74 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 2-8-90
to -105 (Supp. 2013)).
102. Ga. H.R. Bill 381 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 269 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 12-2-6
(2012 & Supp. 2013)).
103. Ga. H.R. Bill 177 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 777 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 12-3402 (2012 & Supp. 2013)).
104. Ga. S. Bill 231 § 1, Reg. Sees., 2013 Ga. Laws 741 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-21179 (2012 & Supp. 2013)).
105. Ga. H.R. Bill 116 §§ 1, 2, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 769 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§§ 20-2-14(b), -14.1(aX3) (2012 & Supp. 2013)).
106. Ga. H.R. Bill 287 pt. I, § 1-1, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 594 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 20-3-41 (Supp. 2013)).
107. Ga. S. Bill 100 § 1, Reg. Sees., 2013 Ga. Laws 675 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-14-91
(Supp. 2013)).
108. Ga. H.R. Bill 143 §§ 1, 8, Reg. Sees., 2013 Ga. Laws 173 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 215-6(bX19) (Supp. 2013)).
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Secretary of State to the Department of Community Health, following in
the footsteps of similar past health-related transfers."'s
11. There is now created the Federal and State Funded Health Care
Financing Programs Overview Committee as a part of the legislative
branch of government.no
12. The Georgia Alzheimer's and Related Dementias State Plan Task
Force has now been created."'
13. The Georgia Workforce Investment Board received amendments,
including the creation of local workforce investment boards that will help
in assigned areas. 1 2
14. There is now a Returning Veterans Task Force to improve
services rendered to military service veterans.1
15. Designated within the Motor Carrier Compliance Division of the
Department of Public Safety is a section to be called the Regulatory
Compliance Section."'
16. The Department of Public Safety will now administer the
responsibilities given under the federal Unified Carrier Registration Act
of 2005 instead of the Department of Revenue.'
17. The Georgia Board of Nursing has been updated regarding its
membership, and there is no longer a Georgia Board of Examiners of
Licensed Practical Nurses.116
18. An entity to be known as the Invest Georgia Fund has been
created to provide a source of capital for start-up ventures." 7

109. Ga. H.R. Bill 132 pt. 1, §§ 1-1 to -17, and pt. II, §§ 2-1 to -18, 2013 Ga. Laws 192
(codified in various provisions of O.C.GA. ch. 26-4, ch. 43-11 (Supp. 2013)).
110. Ga. S. Bill 62 § 3, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 1037 (codified at O.C.GA. § 31-8-210
(Supp. 2013)).
111. Ga. S. Bill 14 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 586 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 31-8-301,
-302 (Supp. 2013)).
112. Ga. H.R. Bill 393 § 2, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 573 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 3414-20, -28 (Supp. 2013)).
113. Ga. S. Bill 76 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 563 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 38-4-90
to -92 (Supp. 2013)).
114. Ga. H.R. Bill 323 § 2, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 838 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-152 (Supp. 2013)).
115. Ga. H.R. Bill 255 § 2, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 756 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-2140 (Supp. 2013)).
116. Ga. H.R. Bill 332 §§ 1, 3, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 643 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§§ 43-26-4, -32(2), (3) (Supp. 2013)).
117. Ga. H.R. Bill 318 § 5, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 243 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 1010-10 to -20 (Supp. 2013)).
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19. The Georgia Lottery Corporation will now administer and enforce
provisions related to coin-operated amusement machines and licenses,
a task previously performed by the Department of Revenue."s
20. The Georgia Tourism Foundation has an updated membership
selection."'
21. The Georgia Council for the Arts has a change in membership
structure, along with provisions for meetings and responsibilities."1o

118. Ga. H.R. Bill 487 pt. I, § 1-1, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 37 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§§ 50-27-70 to -89 (2013)).
119. Ga. S. Bill 177 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 685 (codified at O.C.GA. § 50-717(e) (2013)).
120. Ga. H.R. Bill 338 §§ 3, 4, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 1042 (codified at O.C.G.A.
H§ 50-12-22, -23 (2013)).

